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 The relationship between EU and U.S. antitrust regulators is widely considered to be a 
model of successful transgovernmental cooperation.1  With foundations developed primarily in 
the 1990s during the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, this relationship 
remained strong through the George W. Bush administration.  Notwithstanding high profile 
transatlantic antitrust disputes in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and General 
Electric/Honeywell merger cases, cooperation generally predominated over conflict during this 
period. 
 But at the time of the transition from the Bush administration to the Barack Obama 
administration in 2009, there were reasons to expect change in EU-U.S. antitrust relations.  Some 
observers predicted that U.S. antitrust enforcement under Obama would be more vigorous than 
under Bush.2  Others expected Obama to place more emphasis on international cooperation than 
his predecessor, but with a focus on Asia more than Europe.3  In the same year, the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force, amending the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), creating a new 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), and provoking debate about the 
implications for EU antitrust policy.4  Meanwhile, the global financial crisis was deeply affecting 
both the European Union and the United States, raising doubts about the effectiveness of 
antitrust policy as pursued by EU and U.S. regulators (Wilson, 2010, p. 65).  In addition, a 
longer-term trend—the growing economic and political influence of rapidly developing countries 
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such as China and India—was creating new challenges for antitrust regulators on both sides of 
the Atlantic (Parisi, 2010, p. 68).5 
 In this chapter, we argue that notwithstanding these developments, there has been more 
continuity than change in EU-U.S. antitrust relations between the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  While there continue to be occasional disagreements regarding both general 
approaches and specific cases, cooperation still predominates over conflict.  And while antitrust 
regulators in both the European Union and the United States have had to adapt to a changing 
global environment, their intensified focus on the rest of the world does not appear to be 
undermining the bilateral EU-U.S. relationship. 
 Section 1 of this chapter provides an overview of EU and U.S. antitrust policies.  Section 
2 discusses the framework for EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation developed in the 1990s.  Section 3 
compares EU-U.S. antitrust relations during the Bush and Obama administrations, focusing 
primarily on merger review cooperation, showing that there has been more continuity than 
change.  Section 4 speculates about the sources of continuity in EU-U.S. antitrust relations.  Our 
explanation emphasizes policy convergence and the domestic institutionalization of transatlantic 
relations.  Section 5 concludes by proposing several avenues for more systematic evaluation and 
understanding of EU-U.S. antitrust relations. 
 
1. EU and U.S. Antitrust Policy  
 Generally speaking, antitrust policy aims “to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging 
firms to behave competitively while yet permitting them to take advantage of every available 
economy that comes from internal or jointly created production efficiencies, or from innovation 
producing new processes or new or improved products” (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2006, p. 4). The 
premise of antitrust policy is that “competition presses producers to satisfy customer wants at the 
lowest price while using the fewest resources.”6  Mergers—combinations of two independent 
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firms into a single firm—are a major focus of antitrust policy because of their potential for 
distorting markets and reducing competition. 
 Some fields of economic activity (such as international trade) are governed by 
international law and international institutions (in the case of international trade, for example, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization).  In contrast, there 
is no formal multilateral treaty or international organization that governs the field of antitrust.  
As a result, antitrust policy remains predominantly national or (in the case of the European 
Union) supranational policy. 
 
 1.1 EU Antitrust Policy 
 The goal of EU antitrust policy is “to make EU markets work better, by ensuring that all 
companies compete equally and fairly on their merits.  This benefits consumers, businesses and 
the European economy as a whole” (European Commission, 2012b).  The European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition enforces EU antitrust rules (European 
Commission, 2012b).  The basic rules are found in the TFEU and a variety of EU regulations.7 
 Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits anti-competitive agreements between firms.  
Specifically, it provides that “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market . . .” shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market.8  Article 102 
prohibits abusive conduct by companies that have a dominant market position.  Specifically, it 
                                                 
7 The regulations include Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
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“(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control 
production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.).  Article 101(3) contains exceptions for certain agreements, decisions or practices which “contribute[] to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit” if specified conditions are satisfied. 




provides that “[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.”9  Article 107 deals with state aid, 
and provides that “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the internal market,” subject to certain exceptions.10 
 Under the 2004 Council regulation on mergers (the “Merger Regulation”), firms planning 
a merger with a “Community dimension”11 must notify the Directorate General and provide it 
with information about the transaction prior to the transaction’s closing (Merger Regulation, 
article 4, section 1)12.  The Directorate General then examines the notification to determine 
whether or not the merger is “compatible with the common market.”  A merger “which would 
significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in 
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared 
incompatible with the common market” and will be prohibited (Merger Regulation, article 2, 
section 3 and article 7, section 1).  Ordinarily, the Directorate General must reach its decision 
                                                 
9 Article 102 also provides specific examples: “Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of 
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
10 Article 107(2) lists types of aid that “shall be compatible with the internal market” and Article 107(3) lists types 
of aid that “may be considered compatible with the internal market.” 
11 Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation provides “[a] concentration has a Community dimension where: (a) the 
combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5000 million; and (b) 
the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 
250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-
wide turnover within one and the same Member State.”  Article 1(3) provides that “[a] concentration that does not 
meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate 
worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2500 million; (b) in each of at least three 
Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; 
(c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the 
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and 
the same Member State.” 
12 Ordinarily, this notification is to occur after the signing of the merger agreement, but an exception allowing earlier 
notification is available when the parties demonstrate a “good faith intention to conclude an agreement” (Merger 
Regulation, article 4, section 2). 




within twenty-five working days following the receipt of notification, although it can increase 
the time period by an additional ninety working days if it determines that an in-depth “phase II” 
review is required (Merger Regulation, article 10, sections 1 and 3).13 
 
 1.2 U.S. Antitrust Policy 
 Two federal agencies enforce US antitrust law: the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
through its Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), through its Bureau 
of Competition (Broder, 2011, p. 2).  As the DOJ puts it: 
 
The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity by 
promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace.  Competition in a free market 
benefits American consumers through lower prices, better quality and greater choice. 
Competition provides businesses the opportunity to compete on price and quality, in an 
open market and on a level playing field, unhampered by anticompetitive restraints. 
Competition also tests and hardens American companies at home, the better to succeed 
abroad (United States Department of Justice, n.d. b). 
 
As the FTC puts it, the goal is to promote “the rights of American consumers by promoting and 
protecting free and vigorous competition” (Federal Trade Commission, 2008).14 
 The primary U.S. antitrust rules are found in a variety of statutes, including the Sherman 
Act and the Clayton Act.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination . . 
. or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.”  The courts have held 
that certain practices are per se illegal under Section 1, including price-fixing, bid-rigging, and 
customer and market allocations (Broder, 2012, pp. 17-18).  Other restraints are assessed using a 
“rule of reason” to determine whether the practice’s pro-competitive effects outweigh its 
anticompetitive effects (Broder, 2012, p. 18).  Section 1 is roughly analogous to Article 101 of 
the TFEU, in that it governs anticompetitive agreements.  Section 102 of the Sherman Act 
                                                 
13 See also European Commission (2004a). 
14 See also Federal Trade Commission (2008): “[T]he antitrust laws have had the same basic objective: to protect the 
process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to 
operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.”  




prohibits monopolization, and is roughly analogous to Article 2 of the TFEU in that it governs 
single-firm conduct (Broder, 2012, p. 18). 
 Among other things, the Clayton Act contains rules pertaining to mergers.  Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act prohibits mergers “the effect [of which] may be substantially to lessen 
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”  In general, the Clayton Act requires that firms 
planning a merger that exceeds a specified size threshold must notify the DOJ and the FTC of the 
proposed transaction and wait for a time period (usually thirty days) before completing the 
transaction (Federal Trade Commission, 2008, p. 1).  If either agency decides further 
examination is necessary, that agency may make a “second request” for information and extend 
the waiting period (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 1).  If the DOJ or FTC finds the 
proposed transaction may violate antitrust laws, that agency may seek a court order barring the 
transaction (Federal Trade Commission, 2009b, p. 2).  
 
2. The Foundations of EU-U.S. Antitrust Relations  
 A challenge for both EU and U.S. regulators is that while antitrust law is national (or, in 
the case of the European Union, supranational), markets are global.15  Economic activity in one 
country can have anticompetitive effects in another country.  For example, a merger of two firms 
outside Europe may affect markets inside Europe, just as a merger of two firms outside the 
United States may affect markets inside the United States.  How can EU and U.S. antitrust 
authorities regulate such activity effectively? 
 
 2.1 Extraterritoriality 
 The traditional approach is to apply domestic antitrust law extraterritorially.  For 
example, one country may apply its merger regulations to the merger of two companies in 
another country, and potentially rule against the merger if it finds that the merger would have 
anticompetitive effects in domestic markets.  U.S. regulators have long applied U.S. antitrust 
rules to transactions involving companies outside the United States, based on concerns about the 
effects of those transactions inside the United States.  Beginning in the late 1980s, the European 
                                                 
15 See Smitherman (2007, p. 17): “Competition laws remain national, while markets and merger activity, as well as 
anticompetitive conduct, have become increasingly international. . . . Historically, states have responded by 
extending national laws via applying them extraterritorially . . . . Though controversial, the practice has been the 
catalyst for transnational cooperative efforts . . . .” 




Union likewise began applying its antitrust law extraterritorially (Smitherman, 2007, p. 33-43).  
However, the extraterritorial approach is far from ideal.  Relying on unilateral application of 
national and supranational rules can lead to over- (or under-) regulation, simultaneous 
application of conflicting rules, enforcement difficulties, and international disputes that can spill 
over into other policy areas. 
 
 2.2 The Framework for Transgovernmental Cooperation  
 The challenges of antitrust enforcement in a globalized world and the limits of unilateral 
extraterritorial approaches create the potential for mutual gains from antitrust cooperation.  This 
potential has yet to give rise to a formal EU-U.S. treaty governing antitrust.  But in the absence 
of formal interstate arrangements, there nevertheless has been substantial transgovernmental 
cooperation—that is, “regular and purposive relations among like government units working 
across . . . borders” (Slaughter, 2004, p. 12-13),16 in this case between EU and U.S. antitrust 
regulators (the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, and the DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division and the FTC’s Bureau of Competition). 
 During the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton presidencies, the European Union and the 
United States jointly produced a series of documents—including agreements, formal 
declarations, and statements of best practices—that provide a framework for EU-U.S. 
transgovernmental antitrust cooperation.  In 1990, President Bush and European Commission 
President Jacques Delors signed the Transatlantic Declaration on E.C.-U.S. Relations (the 
“TAD”).  The TAD declares that the European Union and the United States will pursue dialog on 
a variety of matters, including competition policy.17 
 In 1991, European Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, U.S. Attorney General 
William P. Barr and FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger signed the Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities 
Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws (the “1991 Agreement”).  The 1991 
Agreement contains guidelines for notification by each party to the other “whenever its 
competition authorities become aware that their enforcement activities may affect important 
                                                 
16 For an account of why EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation is primarily transgovernmental rather than interstate, see 
Whytock (2005). 
17 See Pollack and Shaffer, 2001, p. 14.  The text of the TAD is available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/. 




interests of the other Party”; the exchange of information by “appropriate officials from the 
competition authorities of each party”; coordination by competition authorities in enforcement 
activities; and prompt consultation at the request of either party “at the appropriate level, which 
may include consultations between the heads of the competition authorities concerned.”18 
Efforts to build a framework for EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation continued, and perhaps 
even intensified, during the Clinton presidency.  In 1995, Jacques Santer, President of the 
European Commission, Felipe Gonzalez, President of the EU Council of Ministers and Prime 
Minister of Spain, and President Clinton, endorsed the New Transatlantic Agenda (the “NTA”).  
The NTA states that the European Union and the United States “will address in appropriate fora 
problems where trade intersects with . . . competition policy.”  In the accompanying Joint EU-
U.S. Action Plan, the parties stated that they “will pursue work on the scope for multilateral 
action in the fields of trade and competition policy.  Our competition authorities will cooperate in 
working with other countries to develop effective antitrust regimes. . . .  We will pursue, and 
build on, bilateral cooperation in the immediate term based on the E.C.-U.S. Agreement of 1991.  
We will examine the options for deepening cooperation on competition matters, including the 
possibility of a further agreement.”19 
 At the London EU-U.S. Summit of May 18, 1998, President Clinton, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, and Commission president Santer issued a statement on the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (the “TEP”) (White House Office of Press Secretary, 1998).  In this statement, the 
parties agreed to “exchange views inter alia on issues relating to the question of multilateral rules 
on competition law and its enforcement, and on means of enhancing international cooperation 
among competition authorities in relation to anticompetitive practices with a significant impact 
on international trade and investment,” at upcoming World Trade Organization meetings.  The 
parties also stated that they “will continue to explore possibilities for further cooperation in the 
implementation of [EU and U.S.] competition laws.”20 
 On June 4, 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno and FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, on 
behalf of the United States, and Karel Van Miert, European Commissioner for Competition 
                                                 
18 The text of the 1991 Agreement is available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-
arrangements.html. 
19 The text of the NTA and the Joint Action Plan is available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/. 
20 The text of the TEP is available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/. 




Policy, and Margaret Beckett, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
on behalf of the Council of the European Union, signed the Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive 
Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws (the “1998 Agreement”).21  
Among other things, the 1998 Agreement provides that “[t]he competition authorities of a 
Requesting Party may request the competition authorities of a Requested Party to investigate 
and, if warranted, to remedy anticompetitive activities in accordance with the Requested Party’s 
competition laws” and specifies circumstances in which “[t]he competition authorities of a 
Requesting Party will normally defer or suspend their own enforcement activities in favor of 
enforcement activities by the competition authorities of the Requested Party.” 
 In 1999, EU and U.S. antitrust authorities adopted the Administrative Arrangement on 
Attendance (the “AAA”), which provides guidelines for “reciprocal attendance at certain stages 
of the procedures in individual cases involving the application of their respective competition 
rules” (European Commission 2012d).  In addition, plans for the development of the 
International Competition Network (ICN) took shape during the Clinton presidency.  The ICN is 
an informal network of national antitrust agencies that seeks “to improve and advocate for sound 
competition policy and its enforcement across the global antitrust community” (International 
Competition Network, 2009a).  U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust Joel Klein, along with European Commissioner for Competition Mario 
Monti, played a leading role in developing the ICN (International Competition Network, 2009b).  
Although the ICN is not focused on EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation specifically, it was largely a 
result of EU-U.S. cooperation and provides a framework for EU-U.S. cooperation on multilateral 
antitrust challenges. 
 
 2.3 Transgovernmental Cooperation on Antitrust Matters  
 Cooperation within this framework has taken a variety of forms.  For example, EU and 
U.S. antitrust regulators notified each other of enforcement activities (including merger reviews) 
under the 1991 Agreement with increasing frequency.  EU to U.S. notifications rose from 5 in 
1991 to 42 in 1995 to 104 in 2000, and U.S. to EU notifications rose from 12 in 1991 to 35 in 
                                                 
21 The text of the 1998 Agreement is available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-
arrangements.html.  The 1998 Agreement does not apply to mergers (Federal Trade Commission, 1998). 




1995 to 58 in 2000 (European Commission, 2012c, p. 296).  Communication between EU and 
U.S. antitrust regulators became “a daily activity . . . ranging from high-level case-related 
meetings to regular phone calls, e-mails, and document exchanges between case teams” 
(Smitherman, 2007, p. 54).  This communication entailed information exchanges, joint analysis 
of economic matters such as the definition of product markets (e.g. in the 1999 Exxon/Mobil and 
Amoco/Arco mergers), coordination of investigations, and coordination of remedies (e.g. in the 
1994 Shell/Montedison and 1997 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger cases) (Smitherman, 
2007, p. 54-56).  According to former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris, there were 75 merger 
cases between 1991 and 1999 where there was communication between EU and U.S. regulators 
that confirmed decisions to clear, clear with undertakings, or challenge proposed mergers (Muris, 
2001, at n. 15).  Merger cases during the 1990s that were concurrently reviewed by EU and U.S. 
authorities generally resulted in complementary rather than conflicting enforcement decisions 
(Parisi, 2010, pp. 55-72). 
 To be sure, there were significant disagreements between the European Union and the 
United States on antitrust matters during the 1990s.  Most prominently, in 1997 EU antitrust 
authorities rejected the proposed merger of Boeing Company and the McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation—both U.S. businesses without production assets in the European Union—after the 
merger had been cleared by U.S. antitrust authorities.  This case prompted U.S. and European 
politicians to accuse each other of attempting to protect their national champions and provoked 
fears of a transatlantic trade war (Janow, 2000, p. 44). 
 But overall, cooperation predominated over conflict in EU-U.S. antitrust relations in the 
1990s.  As one expert put it, “[C]ooperation between U.S. and European competition authorities 
appears to have deepened and broadened and become regularized” (Janow, 2000, p. 42).  
Antitrust officials on both sides of the Atlantic shared this assessment.  On the EU side, 
Alexander Schaub, formerly the European Commission’s Director General for Competition, 
commented that “staff level contacts have become a daily routine in our work” and noted that 
merger control is “the area where daily U.S.-EU cooperation has reached the most advanced 
stage” (Schaub, 2002, pp. 9-10).  On the U.S. side, former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky noted 
that “virtually all knowledgeable observers agree that there has been substantial convergence in 
the method and content of merger enforcement in the E.C. and U.S., and a remarkable 
improvement in coordination and cooperation between the two enforcement authorities” 




(Pitofsky, 2000, part III(B)(1)).  Even in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, conflict ultimately 
was resolved, with EU authorities ultimately clearing the merger (albeit subject to various 
undertakings on the part of Boeing) (Boeder, 2000, p. 142)—and the dispute surely helped 
motivate the 1998 Agreement, which enhanced the framework for future transgovernmental 
cooperation. 
 
3. EU-U.S. Antitrust Relations under Bush and Obama  
 How much have the factors highlighted above—the transition from Bush to Obama, the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty, the global economic crisis, and the growing influence of emerging 
economies—affected EU-U.S. antitrust relations?  This section takes some preliminary steps 
toward answering this question.  First, it assesses the development of the framework for EU-U.S. 
antitrust cooperation during the Obama and Bush administrations.  Second, it examines specific 
instances of EU-U.S. cooperation in merger review during the two administrations as one way of 
evaluating the extent to which regulators are actually using the framework for cooperation.  
Third, it compares how EU and U.S. antitrust regulators themselves have characterized their 
relationship in official agency reports during the two administrations.  Finally, it tracks the 
number of references to the European Union in DOJ and FTC antitrust speeches during the two 
administrations as an indicator of the degree of emphasis placed by U.S. officials on EU-U.S. 
antitrust relations.  Overall, the results suggest that there has been more continuity than change in 
EU-U.S. relations between the two periods.  During both administrations, cooperation has 
predominated over conflict. 
 
3.1 Development of a Framework for EU-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation  
 The most active phase of development of the framework for EU-U.S. antitrust 
cooperation took place during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies.  There have been 
fewer, but nevertheless significant, developments in the formal framework move during the 
George W. Bush and Obama presidencies.  For example, although the concept for the ICN 
emerged during the Clinton presidency, it was in October 2001 during the Bush administration 
that FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, EU 




Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, and other national antitrust authorities, officially 
launched the ICN (Federal Trade Commission, 2001).22 
 The next year, FTC Chairman Muris, Assistant Attorney General James, and EU 
Competition Commissioner Monti, released a set of Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger 
Investigations containing detailed guidelines for coordinating merger reviews (the “2002 Best 
Practices”) (Federal Trade Commission, 2002a).  The 2002 Best Practices include provisions for 
coordination on timing, collection and evaluation of evidence, communication between 
reviewing agencies, and crafting remedies and settlements (Federal Trade Commission, 2002a).  
The 2002 Best Practices were a product of the U.S.-EU Merger Working Group, which is a 
group of lawyers and economists from the FTC, the DOJ, and the E.U (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2002b). 
 At the EU-U.S. Summit on April 30, 2007, European Commission President Barroso, 
German Chancellor Merkel (Chair of the European Council) and President Bush signed the 
Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration between the United States of 
America and the European Union (European Commission, 2007).  The document established a 
Transatlantic Economic Council co-chaired by a U.S. cabinet-level official and a member of the 
European Commission, and declared the parties’ resolve to achieve a number of goals, including 
a number of priority areas of cooperation, including intellectual property rights, trade, financial 
markets, innovation and technology, and investment (European Commission, 2007, p. 3).  
Interestingly, antitrust is not among the areas of cooperation enumerated in the framework—but 
the recitals express the parties’ recognition of the importance of competition policy and the joint 
work that the European Union and the United States have undertaken in that field. 
 In 2011, during the Obama presidency, the European Commission, the DOJ and the FTC 
issued revised Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations (the “2011 Best 
Practices”).23  The 2011 Best Practices are more detailed than the 2002 Best Practices.  They 
“[p]rovide more guidance to firms about how to work with the agencies to coordinate and 
facilitate the reviews of their proposed transactions; [r]ecognize that transactions that authorities 
                                                 
22 The ICN’s website, where the full text of the memorandum establishing the ICN can be found, is 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. 
23 The text of the 2011 Best Practices is available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-
arrangements.html. 




in the US and Europe review may also be subject to antitrust review in other countries; and 
[p]lace greater emphasis on coordination among the agencies at key stages of their 
investigations, including the final stage in which agencies consider potential remedies to 
preserve competition” (United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, 2011). 
 In summary, while neither administration oversaw developments in the framework for 
cooperation as substantial as those in the 1990s, modest but significant progress was made 
during both administrations, particularly in the field of merger review.  The 2011 Best Practices 
may lead to improvements in merger review cooperation, but overall this comparison of the Bush 
and Obama administrations’ respective framework-building accomplishments suggests more 
continuity than change in EU-U.S. antitrust relations. 
 
 3.2 EU-U.S. Merger Review  
 Cases of EU-U.S. merger review show that regulators have extensively used the 
framework for cooperation during both the Bush and Obama administrations.  For example, 
during the Bush administration, the European Commission and the DOJ both approved Thomson 
Corporation’s acquisition of Reuters Group, subject to consistent sets of remedies, after having 
“cooperated extensively throughout the course of their investigations” and “with frequent contact 
between the investigative staffs and the sharing of documents and information . . . .” (Federal 
Trade Commission, 2009a, p. 10).  Similarly, cooperation “throughout the course of their 
respective investigations” led to clearances by the DOJ and the European Commission, with 
consistent remedies, of Cookson Group’s acquisition of Foseco in 2008 (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2008a, p. 11). 
 During the Obama administration, the European Commission and the Antitrust Division 
both approved Cisco System’s acquisition of Tandberg ASA, with the Antitrust Division 
explaining that “it had taken into account commitments Cisco had made to the EC as part of the 
EC’s merger clearance process” and calling the joint investigation “a model of international 
cooperation between the United States and the European Commission” (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2011, p.8).  EU and U.S. regulators also cooperated extensively to reach consistent 
remedies relating to the 2009 acquisition of Enodis Corporation by The Manitowoc Company 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2010, p. 7-8). 




 In fact, according to one expert, the only major conflict in EU-U.S. merger review since 
the Boeing/McDonnell Douglass transaction (which regulators on both sides of the Atlantic 
ultimately approved) has been the General Electric/Honeywell case (Parisi, 2010, p. 56).  The 
DOJ cleared the merger of General Electric and Honeywell International in May 2001, but in 
July 2001 the European Commission issued a decision blocking the transaction (Smitherman, 
2007, pp. 84-95).  The merger did not take place.  One might add to the short list of recent 
merger review conflicts the Oracle/Sun Microsystems case.  The DOJ cleared the transaction in 
August 2009, but in November 2009 the European Commission issued a set of objections (John, 
Depoortere, & Peristerakis, 2011, p. 163; Financial Times, 2009).  Although this resulted in an 
acrimonious exchange of criticisms between high-level officials on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
conflict was eventually resolved and, like the difficult Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, the 
merger was ultimately cleared by the Commission subject to conditions (United States 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 2009, p. 1; John, Depoortere, & Peristerakis, 2011, p. 
163).  Overall however, during both the Bush and Obama administrations, cases of conflict have 
been “outnumbered by many instances of effective and complementary U.S.-EC merger 
enforcement” (Parisi, 2010, p. 61).24 
 
 3.3 Agency Reports 
 Official assessments of EU-U.S. antitrust relations are consistent with the analysis so 
far—they, too, suggest that cooperation has predominated over conflict during both the Bush and 
Obama administrations.  Specifically, we examined three types of reports: (1) the European 
Commission’s Annual Report on Competition Policy (the “EC Reports”), (2) the annual spring 
update of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division (the “DOJ Updates”), and (3) the FTC’s Annual Reports 
to Congress Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the “HSR 
Reports”).25 
 We first counted the number of specific references to EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation in 
these annual reports from 2007 through 2010.  The results are presented in Table 1.  The total 
                                                 
24 Parisi (2010, pp. 70-72) lists dozens of “[m]erger cases concurrently reviewed by EC and FTC since 1992 with 
complementary outcomes, i.e., non-conflicting enforcement decisions.” 
25 The EC Reports are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html.  The DOJ 
Updates are available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-operations.html.  The HSR Reports are available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm. 




number of references was 4 in 2007, 7 in 2008, 5 in 2009, and 6 in 2010.  The numbers are very 
similar for the Bush and Obama administrations, suggesting more continuity than change.  
However, given the small number of references overall, it is not possible to draw reliable 
comparative conclusions.  The small numbers are not surprising because the reports do not 
purport to be comprehensive and probably should not be expected to capture cooperation that has 
become routine.  Therefore, we do not interpret the small number of references as an indication 




 Next, we examined the reports’ narrative descriptions of EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation.  
The EC Reports describe a very close cooperative relationship.  They describe “frequent 
contacts” and “numerous meetings” between EU and U.S. antitrust officials in 2007, 2008, 2009 
and 2010; they characterize cooperation as “very close” (2007), “intense” (2008, 2009) and 
“intensive” (2010); and they note annual bilateral meetings between top EU and U.S. antitrust 
officials. 
 The DOJ Updates likewise describe a close cooperative relationship.  The 2007 DOJ 
Update noted that the Division “worked closely” and “consulted closely” with EU officials.  In 
2008, the DOJ Update stated that “cooperation with foreign antitrust authorities reached an all-
time high” and referred to EU-U.S. work on cartel conduct in the marine hose industry as “a 
model of international coordination.”  In 2009, the DOJ Update noted that the Division “worked 
constructively” with European Commission staff and “continues to work closely with its . . . 
European counterparts on a wide range of cartel, merger, and civil nonmerger enforcement and 
policy matters.”  In 2010, the DOJ Update noted that “[t]he [Antitrust] Division has . . . taken the 
innovative step of hiring Rachel Brandenburger—an accomplished antitrust lawyer in Europe 
and internationally—to serve as a special advisor to [the Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust].  The result of these actions has been more frequent and active engagement with the 
Division’s counterparts around the world . . . .”  The 2010 DOJ Update also noted that the 
Division has been “working actively with its many counterparts around the world in its efforts to 
bring greater cooperation and convergence to the international aspects of antitrust,” including 
with the European Commission.  The 2011 DOJ Update stated that “[i]t is safe to say that 




cooperation with our international counterparts is at an all-time high on enforcement matters,” 
and referred to EU-U.S. cooperation on the Cisco/Tandberg merger investigation as “an excellent 
model for how international cooperation currently is working at the Division and how it should 
work in today’s world of multiple enforcers.”  The 2012 DOJ Update noted that the Antitrust 
Division “cooperated closely” with the European Commission on one merger investigation, and 
“communicated extensively [with the European Commission] throughout the course” of another 
merger investigation.  The HSR Reports do not provide general assessments of EU-U.S. antitrust 
relations, although they do note examples of specific merger cases in which there was close 
cooperation. 
 Like the first indicator, evidence from the agency reports suggests more continuity than 
change in EU-U.S. antitrust relations under the Bush and Obama administrations.  Agencies on 
both sides of the Atlantic describe a very close and active cooperative relationship.  The 2010 
Brandenburger appointment and the 2011 statement that “cooperation with our international 
counterparts is at an all-time high” are pieces of evidence that tend to suggest that U.S. 
involvement in international antitrust cooperation during the Obama presidency might be more 
extensive than it was during the Bush presidency—but since the content of annual reports could 
be influenced as much by administration priorities for cooperation rather than actual levels of 
cooperation, this conclusion must remain highly tentative.  Moreover, both the appointment and 
these statements pertain to international cooperation in general, not EU-U.S. bilateral 
cooperation in particular. 
 
 3.4 Official Speeches  
 As a complement to the more qualitative assessments of EU-U.S. antitrust relations 
presented above, we counted the number of references to the European Union in DOJ and FTC 
antitrust speeches during the two administrations.  This indicator does not track specific 
instances of cooperation or conflict.  We simply use it as one rough measure of the emphasis 
placed by U.S. officials on EU-U.S. antitrust relations. 
 We created two versions of the indicator, one for DOJ speeches and another for FTC 
speeches.  We first downloaded all DOJ and FTC antitrust speeches made during the George W. 




Bush and Obama presidencies that were available on the DOJ and FTC websites.26  This resulted 
in a total of 193 DOJ speeches and 604 FTC speeches.  After downloading the files, two 
programs were used to process the downloaded speeches.  The first program converted speeches 
into text files.27  The second program calculated the total number of times certain keywords 
appear in each file and then the total number of times these keywords appear in each year.28  We 
included keywords designed to capture references to the European Union (including “European 
Union”, “European Commission”, “E.U.”, etc.). 
 The results for DOJ speeches are presented in Figure 1.  The results do not indicate major 
change between the second term of the Bush presidency on the one hand and the Obama 
presidency on the other hand.  Although the number of references to the European Union was 
relatively high in 2005 (70) and low in 2006 (12), the number remained fairly steady (ranging 
between 26 and 34) during the period of 2007-2010.  The number increased significantly in 
2011, but without more data it is difficult to discern whether this represents an upward trend near 




                                                 
26 DOJ Antitrust Division speeches are available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/index.html.  FTC 
speeches are available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/speech1.shtm. 
27 The first program was written using both the standard Perl programming language and an open-source third-party 
library extension CAM::PDF, which is a PDF file manipulation library, available at 
http://search.cpan.org/dist/CAM-PDF/.  The program automatically finds all the PDF files in the present directory 
and converts the PDF files into TXT files.  Certain PDF files cannot be processed by the CAM::PDF utility and this 
program. Text from these files are directly copied and pasted into TXT files that are analyzed together with other 
files by the second program.  A Perl program environment is necessary to execute the program.  Details on how to 
download the Perl environment can be found at http://www.perl.org/. The data presented in this paper and the 
analysis programs are available upon request.  
28 The second Perl program works by scanning all the words in the TXT files contained in a folder and indexes the 
words to keep track of pre-defined keywords in the header section of the program.  The program then outputs 
specific statistics for each file and concise yearly summaries, which were used to produce an overall summary of 
keywords from 2001 to March, 2012.  
29 The 2011 increase could be due to the appointment of Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor to Assistant 
Attorney General Christine Varney in the International Antitrust Division in 2010, who gave several speeches in 
2011 focusing directly on the issue of transatlantic antitrust cooperation, and to the adoption of the 2011 Best 
Practices.  See e.g., Brandenburger, R. (2011) Promoting innovation through competition. Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/279093.pdf.  See also Brandenburger, R. (2011) Twenty years of 
transatlantic antitrust cooperation: The past and the future. Retrieved from 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/articles/279068.pdf.  




 The results for FTC speeches are presented in Figure 2.  In contrast to the overall decline 
in the number of references to the European Union in DOJ speeches since 2001, there has been 
an overall increase in FTC speeches.  However, consistent with the results for DOJ speeches, the 
results for the FTC speeches suggest more continuity than change during the second term of the 
Bush presidency and the Obama presidency so far.  Specifically, the number of references to the 
European Union in FTC speeches between 2005 and 2011 have generally ranged between 
roughly 150 and 250, with one dip (to under 50) in 2006 and another (to just over 100) in 2010.  
The year with the largest number of references so far is 2011 (238 references), but there is 
insufficient data to determine whether this indicates a more general upward trend in the second 




4. Sources of Continuity in EU-U.S. Antitrust Relations  
 What explains the apparent stability between the Bush and Obama administrations in EU-
U.S. antitrust relations—notwithstanding partisan change, the Lisbon Treaty, the global 
economic crisis, and the growing influence of emerging economies?  Three sources of continuity 
stand out as possible explanations: domestic institutionalization, bipartisan support, and policy 
convergence. 
 
 4.1 The Domestic Institutionalization of Transatlantic Cooperation  
 A first factor that may help explain continuity in EU-U.S. antitrust relations is the 
domestic institutionalization of cooperation.  Although international relations scholars are 
increasingly studying domestic institutions as factors influencing international relations, they 
remain largely focused on international institutions.  Yet, at the international level, EU-U.S. 
antitrust relations are only weakly institutionalized.  As discussed above, the bilateral framework 
consists of interagency agreements, declarations, administrative arrangements and statements of 
best practices rather than formal international treaties or international organizations.  But 
antitrust cooperation between the European Union and the United States is deeply 
                                                 
30 As with the DOJ speeches, the 2011 increase may be associated with the adoption of the 2011 Best Practices. 




institutionalized at the domestic level—that is, at the level of their respective antitrust agencies 
and professional antitrust regulators. 
 There are at least two ways in which domestic institutionalization might contribute to the 
durability of EU-U.S. cooperation.  First, the individual regulators who work directly on specific 
antitrust cases—whether merger reviews or other investigatory or enforcement actions—are 
typically career regulators based in national (in the case of the United States) or supranational (in 
the case of the European Union) agencies, rather than politically appointed officials.  These 
individuals, including case handlers and their supervisors, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
cooperate with each other on an individual-to-individual basis, year after year, building 
relationships that are relatively insulated from partisan political changes.  As John Parisi 
describes it: “The process . . . is conducted and overseen by professional staff in the international 
departments of the agencies.  These public servants are grounded in their own agency’s law and 
practices and have acquired expertise about other systems.  They have gotten to know and trust 
their counterparts and they serve as the diplomats who bring together the investigative staffs and 
help to bridge language, knowledge, and analytical gaps between the investigators” (Parisi, 
1999).  These individual-level interactions are the domestic micro-foundations of transatlantic 
cooperation, and would seem to be among the more important factors contributing to continuity 
in EU-U.S. antitrust relations. 
 Second, this institutionalization has taken place in regulatory agencies—the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, the DOJ, and the FTC—that operate with a 
certain degree of autonomy from elected officials.  All of these agencies are, of course, 
potentially subject to political pressure.  Moreover, their decisions can be subject to judicial 
review.  Therefore, they are far from completely autonomous.  Nevertheless, the Directorate 
General for Competition, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC are more autonomous from 
partisan political change than elected heads of state.  This is one reason why domestic 
institutionalization contributes to the durability of EU-.U.S. antitrust cooperation—perhaps even 
more effectively than could formal agreements entered into by the European Union and the 
United States at the head-of-state level. 
 
 4.2 Policy Convergence  




 Second, there has been considerable of convergence of EU and U.S. antitrust policy.  In 
theory, differences in antitrust goals and policies introduce preference heterogeneity and 
distribution problems that can hinder, or even preclude, international or transgovernmental 
cooperation (Koremenos et al. 2001, p. 768; Whytock, 2005, p. 38).  But EU and U.S. antitrust 
goals and policies have grown very close.  As one U.S. antitrust official has explained, the 
antitrust policies of both the European Union and the United States are aimed at a common 
objective: to promote consumer welfare by protecting competition (Brandenburger, 2010).  And 
in the words of a top EU antitrust official: “Put simply, the EU and US agree on what 
competition policy should be all about” (Newman & Echevarria, 2005, p. 27). 
 While the story of EU-U.S. antitrust convergence has largely been a story of convergence 
on U.S. approaches, there are two Obama era policy changes that suggest significant 
convergence of U.S. policy toward EU approaches.  First, in the field of merger review, in 
August 2010 the DOJ and the FTC adopted comprehensive revisions to their 1992 horizontal 
merger guidelines (Horton, 2011, p/158).  The 2010 guidelines “substantially mimic the EC’s” 
(Horton, 2011, p.164).  As one expert speculates, “European Commission (EC) competition 
authorities and practitioners are likely to view the New Guidelines positively, and welcome them 
as a bold step by the American Agencies to bring their own horizontal merger policies closer to 
the EC’s. . . . [T]he New Guidelines represent a substantial progressive step by the American 
Agencies towards convergence with Europe on horizontal merger issues” (Horton, 2011, pp. 158 
and 163). 
 Second, in the field of single-firm conduct, the U.S. approach may be converging on the 
EU approach.  During the Bush presidency, a significant area of divergence was in the area of 
single-firm conduct (Sokol, 2009, p. 7).  However, Obama’s Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust, Christine Varney, withdrew guidelines for single-firm conduct cases under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act that had been issued during the Bush administration.  This move has been 
interpreted as signaling a more aggressive U.S. approach to single firm-conduct cases, more in 
line with the EU approach.31  As Varney explains, “The analytical approaches of the US and the 
European Commission [on single-firm conduct] are more similar than ever before. . . . [But] 
[d]espite these similarities, there’s much room for further convergence” (2009, pp. 2-3). 
                                                 
31 See Harty (2010): noting that the Obama administration is likely to take “a more aggressive approach to merger 
review and single-firm conduct” (pp. 54-55).  




 Preference heterogeneity and distribution problems will never be completely eliminated 
from the EU-U.S. antitrust relationship.  For example, “[D]espite the increased antitrust 
enforcement promised by the Obama administration, European regulators still remain more 
aggressive enforcers of antitrust law than US regulators” (Harty, 2010, p. 58).  However, these 
barriers to cooperation have largely dissipated, providing another possible explanation for the 
robustness of EU-U.S. antitrust cooperation. 
 
 4.3 Bipartisan Support  
 Finally, partisan factors do not seem to play a major role in EU-U.S. antitrust relations.  
To the contrary, the importance of a close cooperative relationship seems to be accepted by both 
Democratic and Republican administrations in the United States—as evidenced by the efforts 
made during the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, through the George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama administrations, to develop an effective framework for 
transgovernmental cooperation on antitrust matters.  While partisan issues may arise regarding 
particular aspects of antitrust policy—with Obama, for example, promising to enforce antitrust 
rules more vigorously than Bush—these differences do not appear to undermine what seems to 
be bipartisan recognition of the importance of close EU-U.S. cooperation on antitrust matters. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Based on this chapter’s analysis, we conclude that there has been more continuity than 
change in EU-U.S. antitrust relations during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
presidencies.  In both periods, cooperation has predominated over conflict, notwithstanding a 
variety of factors—including partisan change, the Lisbon Treaty, and the global economic 
crisis—that could have been expected to disrupt the EU-U.S. relationship.  We speculate that this 
continuity can be explained, at least in part, by the domestic institutionalization of cooperation, 
policy convergence, and bipartisan recognition of the importance of EU-U.S. antitrust 
cooperation. Indeed, we suspect that these are among the most important factors that influence 
transatlantic cooperation in general. 
 There are several possible avenues for more systematic evaluation of EU-U.S. antitrust 
cooperation than we have been able to undertake in this chapter.  In the field of merger review 
cooperation, an attempt could be made to identify every proposed merger with a potential 




transatlantic dimension, including all mergers notified to both EU and U.S. authorities, and to 
examine the extent and nature of cooperation in each case or a carefully selected sample of cases.  
Beyond merger review, analysis could be extended to cooperation in two other important areas 
of antitrust policy: cartels and single-firm conduct.  Interviews with EU and U.S. antitrust staff 
could be an important complement to analysis of publicly available reports, speeches, and other 
documents. 
 One area that deserves special attention is the growing emphasis of both EU and U.S. 
antitrust officials on developing bilateral and multilateral relationships with their counterparts in 
other countries.32  As a growing number of countries develop active antitrust regimes, the 
likelihood grows that EU and U.S. firms could be subjected to their jurisdiction; and as 
developing countries attract more firms, there is a greater likelihood of anticompetitive activity 
there that could affect EU or U.S. markets.  Thus, EU antitrust authorities are “adopting a more 
strategic approach toward international agreements” focused on emerging antitrust regimes such 
as in China and India (Lagares, 2010, p. 155).  As one DOJ Antitrust Division official recently 
explained, “We no longer live in a ‘bipolar’ antitrust world.  In addition to Washington, DC and 
Brussels, international companies now routinely must pay attention to the rulings and decisions 
in 27 EU Member States, as well as in Beijing, Berne, Brasilia, Canberra, Moscow, New Delhi, 
Ottawa, Pretoria, Seoul, Tokyo, and elsewhere” (Brandenburger, 2011, p. 7).  The 2011 Best 
Practices include suggestions to address the challenge that “[a]n increasing number of mergers 
reviewed by the DG Competition and the US agencies also are subject to review by other 
competition authorities around the world” (Federal Trade Commission, 2002, p. 2). And in 
addition to working within the multilateral framework of the ICN, both the European Union and 
the United States have entered bilateral arrangements with a variety of other countries. 
                                                 
32 This trend pre-dates the Bush and Obama administrations.  For example, before George W. Bush took office in 
2001, work had already begun on the ICN; the United States already had bilateral antitrust arrangements with 
countries including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Mexico; and the European Union already 
had likewise established a variety of bilateral arrangements with an antitrust component.  More recently, the United 
States established bilateral arrangements with Russia in 2009 and Chile and China in 2011; and the European Union 
established arrangements with Chile in 2002, China in 2003 and Columbia and Peru in 2011.  See European 
Commission. (2012). Bilateral relations on competition issues. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/index.html; United States Department of Justice. (n.d.). 
Antitrust cooperation agreements. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-
arrangements.html; Federal Trade Commission. (2012). International antitrust and consumer protection cooperation 
agreements. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/oia/agreements.shtm. 




 We see no indication that this focus on the rest of the world is at the expense of EU-U.S. 
antitrust cooperation.  Rather, we speculate that EU-U.S. antitrust relations are at this point so 
effectively institutionalized that the European Union and the United States can now direct their 
framework-building resources toward other countries, while fully maintaining their own bilateral 
relationship.  In other words, the marginal return on investment in building relationships with 
other countries may be higher vis-à-vis other countries than vis-à-vis the already firmly 
established EU-U.S. relationship.  The question going forward is the extent to which the efforts 
of the European Union and the United States to develop relationships with the rest of the world 
will be a joint, cooperative endeavor, or instead an area of rivalry. 
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